# SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY, UTILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

# Senator Ben Hueso, Chair 2021 - 2022 Regular

**Bill No:** SB 1469 **Hearing Date:** 4/18/2022

**Author:** Bradford

**Version:** 2/18/2022 Introduced

Urgency: No Fiscal: Yes

Consultant: Nidia Bautista

**SUBJECT:** Water corporations: demand elasticity

**DIGEST:** This bill requires the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to authorize the use of full decoupling of water sales and revenues by water utilities.

#### **ANALYSIS:**

### Existing law:

- 1) Establishes and vests the CPUC with regulatory authority over electrical corporations and water corporations. (Article XII of the California Constitution)
- 2) Requires all charges demanded or received by any public utility for any product or commodity furnished or any service rendered shall be just and reasonable. (Public Utilities Code §451)
- 3) Requires the CPUC to ensure that errors in estimates of demand elasticity or sales do not result in material overcollections or undercollections of electrical corporations. (Public Utilities Code §739.10)
- 4) Requires the CPUC in establishing rates for water service to consider separate charges for costs associated with customer service, facilities, variable operating costs, or other components of the water service provided to water users. (Public Utilities Code §727.5)

This bill requires the CPUC to ensure that errors in estimates of demand elasticity or sales do not result in material overcollections or undercollections of water corporations.

### **Background**

CPUC-regulated water utilities. The CPUC has jurisdiction over water companies, or investor-owned water utilities (IOUs), that provide water service to about 16 percent of California's residents. Approximately 95 percent of those residents are served by nine large water IOUs, known as Class A water utilities, each serving more than 10,000 service connections. Combined, the nine largest utilities serve nearly 1.2 million customers. The majority of the CPUC-regulated water utilities (92) have service connections of 2,000 or less, and 87 of those have service connections of 500 or less.

CPUC water rates. As with other IOUs, the CPUC regulates the rates of the water utilities under its jurisdiction to ensure they are just and reasonable. Class A water utilities file a formal General Rate Case (GRC) application for the CPUC every three years that includes information to justify any proposed rate changes. Class A water utility rates have two main components: a service meter charge and a use charge. The service charge is a monthly (or bi-monthly) charge applied to all customers regardless of how much water is used. The service charge allows water utilities to cover up to 50 percent of their total fixed costs to operate and maintain water systems. The use charge is a charge for actual water used during the bill period. The use charge is calculated by multiplying the usage by the quantity rate. Quantity rates are tiered to allow for different prices per unit of water depending on the amount used and to account for a lower tier for the basic amount of water needed, and to help encourage conservation by pricing higher volumes of water use at a higher rate.

Water Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (WRAM). WRAMs are ratemaking mechanisms developed by the CPUC to incentivize Class A water IOUs to conserve water. WRAM balances are not included in service or use charges. Instead, WRAMs are recovered through a separate surcharge on customer bills. The CPUC has instituted two types of WRAMS: full WRAM and Monterey-style WRAM. Full WRAM is a full sales and revenue decoupling mechanism whereby when actual sales are less than those adopted in the GRC sales forecasts, uncollected revenues may be recovered through a surcharge. When sales are more than those adopted in the GRC sales forecasts, over-collected revenues may result in a refund to customers. Monterey WRAM calculates sales differences due to increasing tiered, quantity rates, also referred to as "conservation rate design." The sales differences come from comparing the revenue collected through the tiered rates and those that would have been collected if there were no tiered rate structure, resulting in a revenue adjustment tracked through the Monterey WRAM.

CPUC pilot program of full WRAM. Full WRAMS were first implemented in 2008 and were developed as part of a pilot program to promote water conservation. The CPUC adopted several settlements between various Class A water utilities and the now Public Advocates Office. These settlements included conservation rate designs and adoption of WRAM as a means of promoting conservation by decoupling sales from revenues. Specifically, the settlement decisions adopted full WRAM mechanisms for California Water Service Company, California-American Water Company, Golden State Water Company, Liberty Utilities (Park Water) Corp., and Liberty Utilities (Apple Valley Ranchos Water) Corp. In contrast, San Jose Water Company and Cal Am's Monterey district have Monterey-style WRAMS.

CPUC issues decision to eliminate full WRAM – decoupling. In proceeding R. 17-06-024 related to water affordability issues, the CPUC adopted a decision (D. 20-08-047) in Phase 1 that among other provisions, eliminated the use of full WRAMs beginning in the next GRC cycle for each of the Class A water utilities and authorized the utilities to petition for a Monterey-style WRAM mechanism. The CPUC's decision noted that the 10-year pilot program did not provide the anticipated benefits, especially in light of the issues it created. Specifically, the CPUC decision noted the full WRAMs did not conserve more than those without them. The CPUC stated that the elimination of the full WRAMs would better induce the utilities to provide more accurate sales forecasts, customers may see their bills increase when they conserve more under full WRAMS, accurate tiered rates also incentivize conservation, full WRAMs resulted in major undercollections and large balances (and rarely credits to customers), the Monterey-style WRAMs are authorized to provide for recovery of revenue, other mechanisms are available to address loss revenue (including Lost Revenue Memorandum Account as utilized by some of the utilities not using WRAMs).

Water IOUs petition California Supreme Court. After the CPUC decision to eliminate full decoupling (the full WRAMs), several of the water utilities petitioned the CPUC for rehearing. Prior to a rehearing decision, Golden State Water filed a petition with the Supreme Court of California for writ of review. The Court granted the CPUC's request to hold the court case in abeyance until a decision on rehearing was issued. In September 2021, the CPUC issued a decision denying rehearing. Subsequently, Golden State Water filed an amended petition with the California Supreme Court and a separate petition was filed by several of the water utilities. The Court has since combined the petitions, but has not issued a decision on the matter, as the cases remain pending.

SB 1469. This bill would implement full decoupling of water utility sales and revenue forecasts, thereby instituting the full WRAM. The proponents of this bill

argue that decoupling of sales and revenue supports conservation efforts, especially critical as the state continues to experience drought conditions.

CPUC regulatory flexibility? Many of the water utilities supporting this bill disagree with the CPUC decision to eliminate the full WRAM. They argue that decoupling provides stability despite changes in water use and ensures that water suppliers only receive the funds they need to safely operate and upgrade the water system. Those opposed to this bill argue that the decision on whether to decouple water utility rates is best left to the CPUC. They note that the issues in determining just and reasonable rates for customers are complex and involve multiple variables, particularly as it relates to encouraging conservation. They oppose this bill as it would overturn a CPUC decision and limit regulatory flexibility. They express concerns that the surcharges imposed by full WRAMs lack transparency, create customer complaints, and can saddle customers with costs for extended periods.

Amendments. Should the committee wish to authorize decoupling for water utilities, the author and committee may wish to amend this bill to recraft the contents into Public Utilities Code §727.5, more clearly providing the option for decoupling mechanisms for water utilities, but ensure that the decoupling mechanism does not result in water utilities earning a revenue windfall by encouraging higher sales.

## Public Utilities Code §727.5

- (d) (1) The commission shall consider, and may authorize, a water corporation to establish programs, including rate designs, for achieving conservation of water and recovering the cost of these programs through the rates. rates if the following condition is met:
- (2) (A) Upon application by a water corporation, the commission may authorize the implementation of a mechanism that separates the water corporation's revenues and its water sales, commonly referred to as a "decoupling mechanism." (B) An authorized decoupling mechanism shall be designed to ensure that the differences between actual and authorized water sales do not result in the overrecovery or underrecovery of the water corporation's authorized water sales revenue.
- (C) An authorized decoupling mechanism shall not enable the water corporation to earn a revenue windfall by encouraging higher sales.

## **Prior/Related Legislation**

SB 29 (Kehoe, Chapter 8, Statutes of 2001) among many provisions of the bill, decoupled electricity sales with revenue recovery for electrical corporations.

AB 2815 (Moore, Chapter 549, Statutes of 1992) authorized the CPUC, in establishing rates for water service, to establish separate charges for costs associated with customer service, facilities, and fixed and variable operating costs, as specified.

FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes

#### **SUPPORT:**

California American Water, Co-sponsor

California Water Service, Co-sponsor

Golden State Water Company, Co-sponsor

San Jose Water Company, Co-sponsor

Liberty Utilities, Co-sponsor

Steve McShane, Salinas City Council Member

350 Silicon Valley

Alliance for Water Efficiency

Alliance to Save Energy

American Council for an Energy-efficient Economy

Bay Area Council

Bay Area Water Supply and Conservation Agency

California Community Economic Development Association

California Hispanic Chamber of Commerce

California Water Efficiency Partnership

California-Nevada Section, American Water Works Association

Carson Chamber of Commerce

Central Valley Business Federation (BizFed)

City of Salinas

City of San Mateo

Commerce Industrial Council Chamber of Commerce

East Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce

El Concilio

Greater Bakersfield Chamber of Commerce

Greater Stockton Chamber of Commerce

Hawthorne Chamber of Commerce

Hermosa Beach Chamber of Commerce

ICON CDC

International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers - Local 26

International Union of Operating Engineers Local 3

Livermore Valley Chamber of Commerce

Lomita Chamber of Commerce

Montebello Chamber of Commerce

Natural Resources Defense Council

Palos Verdes Peninsula Chamber of Commerce

Redondo Beach Chamber of Commerce

San Joaquin County Hispanic Chamber of Commerce

San Jose Chamber of Commerce

San Mateo Area Chamber of Commerce

Silicon Valley Leadership Group

South Bay Association of Chambers of Commerce

Sustainable Silicon Valley

West Basin Water Association

#### **OPPOSITION:**

Public Advocates Office, unless amended

**Public Water Now** 

## **ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT:** According to the author:

SB 1469 is seeking to memorialize a long-held practice of ratemaking that has been used to encourage conservation. Decoupling has been in place for energy utilities since the 1980s and the Legislature made the program permanent in 2001 as part of the policies and practices established after the 2000 energy crisis.

Utility rate decoupling works – Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, the largest municipal utility in the United States, serving four million residents and businesses implemented decoupling for its water utility in 2016... SB 1469 reinstates rate decoupling to ensure that both costs savings and conservation benefits continue to be available for customers throughout California.

Many of the supporters of this bill note the need to ensure decoupling of water sales and revenues. In support of this bill, California American Water states: "a proven way to encourage water conservation is through the best-practice of decoupling... Decoupling allows water suppliers to encourage maximum water conservation while having assurance they will have sufficient revenues to safely and reliably deliver water."

ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: In opposition to this bill, the Public Advocates Office states that SB 1469 does not advance of the goals of promoting conservation or keeping water rates affordable. They note that the CPUC eliminated decoupling after 10 years of experience with a pilot project. The Public Advocates Office opposes decoupling as it "charges customers for any reduction in sales, even those unrelated to conservation, such as economic downturn...", limits transparency on cumulative bill impacts, removes the incentive for water utilities to accurately forecast sales and costs, and unfairly transferring forecasting risks to customers.

Those opposed to this bill express concerns that the full WRAM punishes customers for conservation by billing them with additional surcharges unrelated to their water usage. Public Water Now states that "because WRAM calculates the difference between estimated and actual sales, and not the difference between actual sales and the sales necessary to achieve a reasonable shareholder return WRAM surcharges will often allow a water utility to exceed its authorized rate of return."